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INDIANA LA IF JOURNAL
the protection originally intended to be given to the Board by the Act.15 The
Board's finding as to the facts is final if the evidence, unhampered by technical
rules of admissibility, would cause reasonable minds to differ. If this case
is followed in other circuits, the present presumption against the Board will
be changed to one in favor of the Board. P. T. M.
CONTRACTS-CONTINGENT FEES FOR INFLUENCING LEISLATION.Property of
the defendant, an alien corporation, was seized during the World War, and
held for some time thereafter by the Alien Property Custodian. Defendant
contracted with plaintiff to obtain legislation to facilitate the return of the
property, compensation to be on a contingent fee basis. Plaintiff was suc-
cessful in getting such legislation providing for a hearing before a proper
tribunal to determine the right of the company to such property. Before
recovery of the property, plaintiff was discharged. He sues on the contract.
Held, he may not recover. Brown v. Gesellsczaft fur Drahtlose Telegraphie,
M. B. H. (C. C. A. D. C., 1939), 104 F. (2d) 227.1
Attorneys generally have been unable to recover on contracts to influence
legislation whether improper means were shown to have been used or not.
2
Some courts, however, have made a distinction between "lobbying" contracts,
in which improper means are used, and contracts whereby the attorney merely
assists in drafting legislation and appears in favor of the bill before com-
mittees.3  Every citizen should be allowed to employ agents to draft bills
and explain the bill to committees in hearing; and when the contract con-
templates nothing further it should not be considered illegal.
4
No matter how courts may rule on contracts for influencing legislation
where the compensation is fixed, they have been very chary of allowing
recovery for such a contract where the compensation is contingent upon success
in obtaining passage of the bill, on the grounds that such a contract tends
to encourage the use of improper means, whether openly or surreptitiously. 5
Nevertheless, there has been a recent tendency toward allowing recovery on
contingent fee contracts for influencing legislation where there has been no
1549 Stat L. 449, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1937), § 150.
1 See also Gesellschaft fur Drahtlose Telegraphie M. B. H. v. Brown
(1935), 78 F. (2d) 410.
2 Adams v. E. Boston Co. (1920), 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628; Hardesty
v. Dodge Manufacturing Co. (1927), 89 Ind. App. 184, 154- N. E 697; Hayward
v Nordberg Manufacturing Co. (1898), 85 F. 4; Marshall v. Baltimore and
Ohio R. R. Co. (1853), 16 How. (57 U. S.) 314; Sussman v. Porter (1905),
137 F. 161. See also Tool Co. v. Norris (1864), 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 45, 17
L. Ed. 868, where the court says: ". . . all agreements for pecuniary con-
siderations to control the business operations of the government, or regular
administration of justice, or appointments to public offices, or the ordinary
course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to
the question, whether improper means are contemplated or used in their
execution." p. 56.
3 Stanton v. Embrey (1876), 93 U. S. 548; West v. Coos County (1925),
115 Ore. 409, 237 P. 961; Chesebrough v. Conover (1893), 140 N. Y. 382, 35
N. E. 633.
4 Chesebrough v. Conover (1893), 140 N. Y. 382, 35 N. E. 633.
5 Hazelton v. Sheckells (1905), 202 U. S. 71, 26 S. Ct. 567; Noonan v.
Gilbert (1934), 68 F (2d) 775.
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RECENT CASE NOTES
proof of improper means either contemplated or used.6 These recent cases
argue that if no improper means were contemplated or used, then there should
be no policy against such contracts. 7
In early Indiana decisions contingent fees for appearance before the
judiciary were prohibited.S Gradually these contracts were recognized as
not leading to any immoral or improper consequences. The temptation to
employ improper means before the judiciary is as great as before the legis-
lature. The same reasons advanced for allowing contingent fees before the
judiciary can be used in arguing for this method of compensation for appear-
ance before the legislature. Many deserving causes will be neglected because
of lack of resources with which to present them unless this method of com-
pensation is allowed. This reasoning applies particularly where the person
desiring legislation has a just claim against the state.9
The Indiana legislature in 1915 prohibited the employment of any person
as legislative counsel on a contingent fee basis.lO Even before this act the
Indiana Supreme Court had declared that contingent fee contracts for influenc-
ing legislation could not be enforced because of the tendency of such contracts
toward the use of improper means.1 1
It would seem that although the principal case is probably correctly de-
cided on the basis of past decisions of the courts, there is strong argument in
favor of allowing recovery in such cases. The case would probably be followed
in Indiana in view of the Statute above mentioned. G. H. E.
CONTRACrs-TEACHERS' TENuRE.-Plaintiff brought suit for the breach of a
permanent teacher's tenure contract, the alleged breach consisting of de-
fendant's refusal to assign him a teaching position since 1931. Damages
sought were loss of salary from date of breach. Held, for defendant; a
permanent tenure teacher's indefinite contract is a protected contractual right
entitling the teacher to a succession of definite contracts, but such indefinite
contract will not sustain an action for compensatory damages. Lost Creek
School Tp., Figo County v. York (Ind. 1939), 21 N. E. (2nd) 58.
The case presents two questions: first, what is the nature of the indefinite
contract for which the statute provides, and second, what are the remedial
rights thereunder? As to the first question, there is sound basis for the
holding that the indefinite contract gives the teacher a mere functional rela-
tionship, a right to be re-employed, and does not provide the specific terms
for the employment in any school year. The tenure act provides that it shall
be construed as supplementary to the Act of 1921 which sets out the require-
ments to be incorporated in teachers' yearly contracts and prohibits the bring-
0Kemble v. Weaver (1925), 200 Iowa 1333, 206 N. V. 83; Stansell v.
Roach (1923), 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520; West v. Coos County (1925), 115
Ore. 409, 237 P. 961.
7 Coyne v. Superior Incinerator Co. of Texas (1936), 80 F. (2d) 844;
Herrick v. Barzee (1920), 96 Ore. 357, 190 P. 141; West v. Coos County
(1925), 115 Ore. 409, 237 P. 961.
S Lafferty v. Jelley (1864), 22 Ind. 471; Scobey v. Ross (1859), 13 Ind. 117.
9 Stroemer v. Van Orsdel (1905), 74 Neb. 132, 103 N. V. 1053.
10 Acts of 1915, Ch. 2, § 4, par. 5; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 34-304.
11 Coquillard's Administrators v. Bearss (1863), 21 Ind. 479.
